ARMED FORCES AND HUMAN RIGHTS

1.-First of all, I would like to thank Mr. Juan Guzman’s invitation to this seminar. It’s a pleasure to be here sharing with all you and so distinguished panelists.

2.-The first thought I want to say is that the great military interventions in politics that has been taken place in Chile were done when political class have been unable to solve the problems that our country suffers, and in any case is that same politicians who asked for the armed forces to intervene.

3.and always, after the crisis has been overcome, governments have solved the problem of the human rights, enacting amnesty laws, taking into account the common welfare, the social peace and the national unity.


4.-Let’s review a little what history says:

a) After the war of Independence and consolidated the republic, Chile faced two political revolutions, that one in 1851 and that of 1859 where two groups were faced, those who fight against the excessive authoritarism and centralization of government and wanted to extend the liberty in elections and those who were in the government, who defended the presidential power. When in 1861, Jose Joaquin Perez was elected president, one of the first task he did, was to wipe out the hates and wishes of revenge, dictating laws of amnesty to all whom from 1851 up to that day, could been or could have been judged for political crimes. With this, he put end to all personal responsabilities caused by the outrages done in those revolutions and therefore forced everyone to look forward to the future.


b) The most emblematic case took place in 1891, when the institutional crisis reached the upmost point due to a large conflict between the President and the Parliament. Both parties asked the Armed Forces to intervene, but differently as in 1973, these parties divided from each other, generating a bigger damage, nothing less than a civil war, that brought as consequence 10 thousands of death, injured and people who disappeared. This damaged was superior of that caused in the Pacific War. If the Armed Forces would have maintained together, the civil war would have been avoided, but it would have been imposed by a bloodless form, since the party that had the support of the military force, was the only one at that time owner of the armed forces.

As consequence of its defeat, the Army, the same one that has been condecorated for its glorious acts in the Pacific War, was dissolved and replaced by one that was in agreement with the winners, meanwhile the civilians during the contest and immediately after the struggle, suffered the harassment, abuse and looting inherent to this kind of conflict, since the world began.
But what did the triunphant government, leaded by the captain of the navy, Jorge Montt?
- Dictaded four successive laws of amnesty

The first was promulgated on december 26th, 1891, this means the same day he assumed as President of the Republic, leaving without penal responsibility to those who participated in the political acts since January 1st up to august 29th of 1891, indicating specially the exceptions.

The second law, promulgated on february 1893, included the admirals and head leaders of the Army that were not included in the law of 1891.
The same year of 1893, a third law was dictaded, giving amnesty to those political crimes that were not included in the previous laws.
Finally, in 1895, a fourth law in general, closed for ever all personal responsabilities that would have been caused by the civil war.
About arbitrariness attributable to the winners, no one said nothing. Nor in that moment nor after, but the results of these laws became apparent when years past and the followers of President Balmaceda return to the political life and the country went back to its normal life.
Now in XXth century

c) In 1924, the government faced a new crisis. With the purpose to move forward its program that was systematically stopped in the Senate, the president Arturo Alessandri came closer to the military forces in order to give him its support. However, what he didn’t took in account, is that the Armed Forces have suffered an evolution since 1891. The Prussian instructors called to upgraded them between 1893 and 1913, have made a professional and modern military force, whose essential characteristics are visible till now.

Indeed, Alessandri and the political class of the parlamentary republic, didn’t notice that the new face of the Armed Forces had produced a significant difference between the high command, inheritance of the Armed Forces guided by the Congress, and the officers formed in the Military School , School of Arms and the War Academy. This new group of officers, from lieutenant colonel downwards, had a very high education even better of that one received by the people in the universities, and in other way, in moral aspect, they felt more patriots than the oligarchy that have governed the country without counterweight since 1891.

Definitively they were convinced of what to do in order to solve the social problems, the boundary problems and the reform that the State needed urgently in order to channel the needs of the new middle class that was emerging, class of which officers belong.

What happened then? Without any shot, on september 5th of 1924, the young officers neutralized the president, who in only one day, approved the social laws that were years being in process, took out the president from the country, and when they thought it was necessary, they brought him back after 6 months, so he could finished its period. Ibañez had the real power, managing from the War Ministry. From there to be president there were only one step, being elected in 1927, with the support of all political forces, except the communists.

But the interest thing was that in 1925 when Alessandri came back, he wanted to restructure the environment and also enacted an amnesty law that benefit all the condemned or judged people whom were processed for incidents done after September 5th of 1924.
d) After the fall of Ibáñez, on july 26th of 1931, an emptiness of power was felt, which was filled with a lot of political experiments: governments that last a few days, a Socialist republic, military coups, the uprising of the Navy, etc. Also in this anarchic period and in order to pacify the people, once more amnesty laws were enacted so hatred can be forgotten. So did Juan Esteban Montero, nullifying the crimes done to the state security. In 1932, General Arturo Puga, member of a Board of Government, did the same but with a larger view, covering all judged people of political crimes.

4) That is how we reached the military coup or military intervention on september 11, 1973, mentioned like this in the Roundtable.
- Here it’s necessary to stop a while. First, we cannot say it was casualty, if not the end of a great and deep crisis in Chilean society. Not either it was a coup as those latinamerican ones, so common, in which a head leader or some military leaders, with personal political ambition, take over the government. It was an institutional act of the Armed Forces, with no political ambition, since the 30st years, after having received the bitter consequences of the fall of President Ibañez. They were calm inside their barracks and were only concerned to be well prepared to defend the country.

How ever, since the cuban revolution began to have importance in the Chilean political actions, at least 10 years before the military intervention in 1973, the most left side of the political parties, saw the Armed Forces as an enemy that must be and it was necessary to overcome so to implement their design of society. Some reasons they had, because historically the Armed Forces have been always anti-communist. But nevertheless they do nothing when Allende became President in 1970 but when they saw that this socialist government want to lead the country to an absolutely different one according to the Chilean traditions, then they thought that it was their moral duty.

It was not less the fear if division between their forces was produced. Up to that day, the internal harmony was maintained and everyone knew that if this harmony weakened, the civil war was unavoidable. But as well known, a civil war could not happened between civilians. The civil war means that the armed forces must divide themselves. Specially the army had clear enough that they have to be loyal to the government, and that they must not discuss nor political or constitutional topics, since they have participated in 1891 in a tragedy that they didn’t want to take part of. Let us think that on june 29th, 1973, a military action occurred that made clear that part of the army was prepared to overthrow the government of that time, without waiting orders from its High command.

Other facts have influenced in this period. Although the disorder and chaos, the lack of food and violence, the outrage to people and laws, the Agreement of the Chamber of Deputies signed on august 23, 1973, in which they require the Armed Forces the fulfillment of the essential function as last guarantee to the state. was of great importance to high commands.

Now it’s well known when this Chamber which represents the legitime power of citizens, ask for help to the armed forces of the State, obviously we assumed that they will act as its own nature and means. Their members were formed in the War Academy not in the Diplomatic Academy, so they act as how they were taught. Neutralize the enemy as soon as possible and at a minimum cost of victims.

Obviously nothing would have happened if there would be nobody to fight with. But there was. Everyone remember the battles that were fought at the House of Government, La Moneda, downtown, and as an open war, soon it did disappear. A group that were not few, choose the way to fight known as irregular war, so they were fought with the same weapons.

Chilean Armed Forces were not prepared to fight in case of an irregular war, and therefore I think that explains a lot what happened. During the second half of XXth Century, many countries suffered this kind of confrontation. Since the communist guerrilla in the French Indochina up to Peru, with the Sendero Luminoso, going through Algeria, Afghanistan and Angola. We are talking about problems caused by different reasons and in different cultures. But in none of these events, it was possible to respect the Human Rights. Nor the rights of the subversives nor the rights of the State. This is the truth, that is what history says.

Now just as the past governments, the Military Government wanted to close the special period with an amnesty law. So it did, dictating the Decree Law Nº 2198 of april 10, 1978, and due to that law, 11.013 people were forgiven, where 9.552 were subversives among them.


Years later, President Patricio Aylwin, when he was finishing his period, pardoned or sent abroad 258 subversives convicted by the Court of Justice whom were responsible of murder or serious wounds to 760 men of the Armed Forces and Police, between them those convicted of murder of General Carol Urzúa, Colonel Fontaine, Lieutenant Colonel Roger Vergara, Lieutenant Zegers and 5 escorts of President Pinochet, whom they died on September 1976, year which was declared “decisive” by the Communist Party.


What happened later is incredible and still is not solved, that is, the appliance of the punishment exclusively to the state agents for trespassing the human rights. Here we can see a mess of instrumental concept of human rights, a heavy ideological force and an international scene, like the cold war, which only one battle was fought in Chile, which will not happen again. By the way, nobody applied the Chilean logic of human rights in countries that before were communists, and in fact Eric Honnecker, the leader of the most
despiteful satellite of the Soviet Union, was welcome here in Chile by the same government that was giving instruction to the Supreme Court how this amnesty law of 1978 must be performed.


To finish, I want to thank once again for this invitation and I would like to say that there is a lot of information that must be gather yet. There are a lot of documents, secret agreements, memories, etc, that will be known later . Only then we can have a more complete and dispassionate vision about why and at what price was omitted to comply with the amnesty law of 1978, leaving open even today the wounds for 35 years.

Patricia Arancibia Clavel
April 2009